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BUSINESS LAW
I. CORPORATIONS
A. Tender Offer Disclosure Act
On June 12, 1978, the South Carolina General Assembly en-
acted the Tender Offer Disclosure Act' in an effort to supplement
the federal regulation of cash tender offers. Similar legislation has
been passed by thirty-two other states,2 but the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently declared such a statute unconstitu-
tional.3 That decision creates much uncertainty regarding the
validity of the South Carolina statute.
The tender offer statute passed by the South Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly is applicable to cash tender offers4 for the acquisi-
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2-10 to -110 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
2. For citations to these statutes see Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d
1256, 1261 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979).
3. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979). On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the Court did not reach the merits of the case, but rather reversed because venue did not
lie in the Northern District of Texas, where the case originated. 99 S. Ct. at 2716-18.
The analysis of the merits by the Fifth Circuit, though now a legal nullity, is presumed
correct.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2-20(2)-(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978) defines "tender offer" and
excludes certain kinds of offers from the coverage of the Act.
"Tender offer" means the offer to acquire or the acquisition of any equity
security of a target company, pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation
for tenders, if after acquisition the offeror would be directly or indirectly a record
or beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of the outstanding
equity securities of the target company.
Id. 35-2-20(2).
"Tender offer" does not include:
(a) An offer to purchase equity securities to be effected by a broker, regis-
tered under the laws of this State, on a stock exchange or in the over-the-counter
market if the broker performs only the customary broker's function, and receives
no more than the customary broker's commissions, and neither the principal nor
the broker solicits or arranges for the solicitation of orders to sell such equity
securities.
(b) An offer made by a corporation to purchase its own equity securities,
or equity securities of another corporation if more than fifty percent of the shares
entitled to vote in the election of directors of the other corporations are held
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tion of equity securities5 of a target company incorporated or
having its principal place of business in South Carolina, or having
located within the state five hundred or more employees or assets
in excess of $10,000,000.1 Any offeror7 making a tender offer that
directly or indirectly by the offering corporation.
(c) An offer the acceptance of which will require a vote by stockholders of
the target company, under the certificate of incorporation or the applicable
corporation statute, on a merger, consolidation share exchange, reclassification
of securities or sale of corporate assets in consideration, in whole or in part, of
the issuance of securities of another corporation.
(d) An offer in which the acquisition by the offeror, in the instant transac-
tion and in all acquisitions of equity securities of the same class during the
preceding twelve months, does not exceed two percent of that class of equity
securities of the target company.
(e) An offer for the sole account of the offer to not more than twenty-five
beneficial owners of the equity securities in question within any consecutive
twelve month period, in good faith and not for the purpose of avoiding this
chapter.
(f) An offer solely in exchange for other securities, except to the extent of
cash for fractions of a unit of securities, for the sole account of the offeror, in
good faith and not for the purpose of avoiding this chapter, where the offeror
has registered the offer pursuant to the terms of the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended, and where the offer has also been registered under the provisions of
the law of this State or is exempted from registration by the terms of the law.
Id. § 35-2-20(3).
5. Id. § 35-2-20(6) defines "equity security."
"Equity security" means (1) any stock, bond or other obligation of a corpo-
ration, the holder of which has the right to vote for the election of members of
the board of directors of the corporation;
(2) any security convertible into a security carrying such rights; or
(3) any right, option or warrant to purchase any of the foregoing.
Id.
6. Id. § 35-2-20(5). The Act also specifically excludes certain types of businesses from
the definition of "target company."
This chapter shall not apply to:
(1) An offer in which the target company is: (i) a domestic insurance com-
pany, as defined in Item (5) of § 38-1-20, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976,
(ii) a bank, as defined in § 34-23-20(a), or a bank holding company as defined
in § 34-23-20(b); (iii) a public utility company or a holding company, as defined
in Section 2 of the Federal Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, pres-
ently constituted as Section 79 of Title 15 of the United States Code, an acquisi-
tion of or by, or merger with which, is subject to approval by the appropriate
federal agency as provided in such act, or (iv) a bank or bank holding company
subject to the Federal Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, presently consti-
tuted as Sections 1841, et seq. of Title 12 of the United States Code, an acquisi-
tion of or by, or merger with which, is subject to approval by the appropriate
federal agency as provided in such act.
(2) A company which is not subject to the registration requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, presently constituted as Section 78 of Title 15
of the United States Code; provided, however, that a company excluded under
the provisions of this item (2) of § 35-2-30 may, upon application to the Securi-
2
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BUSINESS LAW
falls within the scope of this Act first must comply with the
requirements of the South Carolina law, in addition to complying
with the federal requirements promulgated under the Williams
Actv
Prior to 1968 cash tender offers were largely unregulated and
shareholders were given little information to assist them in deter-
mining whether to accept a tender offer.' Congress passed the
Williams Act in 1968 for the purpose of making "all relevant facts
known so that shareholders [would] have a fair opportunity to
make their decision.""' The provisions of the Williams Act in-
clude disclosure requirements and substantive restrictions on
tender offers. Specific information must be provided by any party
making a tender offer that would result in ownership of more than
5% of a class of equity securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11
The South Carolina statute differs from the Williams Act in
several significant respects. Federal law requires that the offeror
file a statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission at
any time prior to the first publication of the offer. 2 The South
Carolina statute contains a more restrictive provision, which re-
quires that the offeror file with the state Securities Commissioner
(the Secretary of State) and also with the management of the
target company. This filing must be made twenty to forty days
before the offer becomes effective.'" The Commissioner has the
option of waiving the twenty-day requirement and allowing the
offer to be made prior to the completion of the waiting period.'4
ties Commissioner, be covered by the provisions of this chapter,
Id. § 35-2-30.
7. Id. § 35-2-20(7) defines "offeror."
"Offeror" means a person who makes a tender offer, and includes persons,
acting jointly or in concert, or who intend to, exercise jointly or in concert any
voting rights attached to the securities for "which the tender offer is made. An
"offeror" does not include any bank, broker-dealer, attorney, accountant or
consultant furnishing information or advice to an offeror and not otherwise
participating in the tender offer.
Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & U.S.C.A. Supp. Pamph. 1978).
9. Sowards & Mopley, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities
Regulation, 41 ST. JoHN's L. RaV. 499 (1967).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& A. NEws 2811, 2813.
11. 15 U.S.C. 99 78m(d), 78n(d) (1976 & U.S.C.A. Supp. Pamph. 1978).
12. Id.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2-50(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
14. Id. § 35-2-60(1)-(2).
1979]
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Conversely, if additional documents or material information are
furnished after the initial filing and fewer than twenty days be-
fore the effective date of the offer, the Commissioner can post-
pone the offer until twenty days after the date of the filing of these
additional documents."5
Although the Williams Act contains no provision for a pre-
offer hearing concerning the tender offer, the South Carolina stat-
ute provides for a hearing to be held pursuant to the Commis-
sioner's order"8 or a request and payment of a $200 fee by the
management of the target company. 7 The hearing must be called
within fifteen days after the filing of the registration statement
(or the amendments) and must commence within ten days after
being called. Within fifteen days after the conclusion of the hear-
ing, the Commissioner must issue an order either permitting or
prohibiting the tender offer."
The disclosure requirements of the Williams Act are consid-
erably less stringent than those of the South Carolina statute.
The federal Act requires the filing to include the identity and
background of the offeror, the source and amount of the funds,
the number of shares in the target company already held by the
offeror, major changes planned for the company after acquisition,
any arrangements regarding the disposition of the stock, any
other information that the Securities and Exchange Commission
may require, and any subsequent changes thereto. The South
Carolina statute expands the required information to include the
consideration to be offered, the dates on which the offer will begin
and end, and any conditions placed upon acceptance of the ten-
dered shares."0 More importantly, the offeror must file copies of
all literature to be furnished to the shareholder "by means of
which the offeror proposes to disclose to offerees all information
material to a decision to accept or reject the offer .... ,,21 This
provision places the offeror in an uncertain position in that he
must decide whether to disclose potentially excessive information
or to risk having the information disclose found incomplete. If the
disclosure subsequently is ruled inadequate, substantial delay
15. Id. § 35-2-50(2).
16. Id. § 35-2-60(3).
17. Id. § 35-2-110.
18. Id. § 35-2-60(4).
19. 15 U.S.C. 99 78m(d)(1)-(2), 78n(d)(1) (1976 & U.S.C.A. Supp. Pamph. 1978).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2-50(1)(c), (d), (f) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
21. Id. § 35-2-50(1)(h).
[Vol. 31
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could result or the Commissioner could totally prohibit the offer.
Requirements of the South Carolina statute concerning the
duration of the offer and the withdrawal rights of shareholders
also differ from federal law. Although the Williams Act contains
no express requirements concerning the duration of the offer, the
provision requiring the offeror to accept, on a pro rata basis, all
shares tendered during the first ten days of the offer has been
interpreted as requiring a minimum tender period of ten days.22
The state Act, on the other hand, expressly requires a tender offer
to remain open for twenty days, commencing on the day after the
date of the first invitation to tender the securities.2 The Williams
Act permits a shareholder to withdraw his shares prior to the end
of the seventh day of the tender period or any time after the
sixtieth day, provided these shares have not been purchased.2'
The South Carolina statute allows withdrawal during the first
twenty days and also following the thirty-fifth day after com-
mencement of the offer.
25
As discussed above, the South Carolina statute contains sev-
eral provisions that substantially conflict with the federal re-
quirements. A significant possibility exists, therefore, that these
provisions will be declared invalid. A similar Idaho statute was
struck down in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,21 the first
case in which a federal court examined the conflict between fed-
eral and state tender offer regulations.
The Idaho statute, like the South Carolina Act, contained
provisions requiring the offeror to submit a copy of the filing
statement to the management of the target company in addition
to filing with state officials and also contained provisions granting
a pre-offer hearing.2 7 Substantial authority was given to the Idaho
Director of Finance, including the power to summarily delay the
effectiveness of the tender offer if the registration statement were
determined to be insufficient. 8
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the Idaho
statute on grounds that federal law had pre-empted the area and
22. E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & S. BERNSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 214 (1977).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2-70(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976 & U.S.C.A. Supp. Pamph. 1978).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2-70(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
26. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979).
27. Id. at 1263.
28. Id.
1979]
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that the statute unconstitutionally interfered with interstate
commerce. The court did not address whether Congress had im-
plicitly pre-empted all state tender offer statutes by passage of
the Williams Act, but rather limited its ruling to situations in
which the state statute conflicted with the federal legislation.
2'
The court placed great emphasis upon the conflict between
the basic purpose of the Williams Act and the situation that
would result from enforcement of the state statute. The Williams
Act was designed "to maintain a neutral policy toward cash
tender offers, by avoiding lengthy delay that might discourage
their chances for success."3 The Idaho statute, like the South
Carolina Act, favored target companies through provisions not
found in the federal Act, including advance notice of the tender
offer and the means to delay the offer by utilizing the pre-offer
hearing provisions.3 1 The court held that the Idaho statute was
pre-empted because the state's promanagement additions to the
federal disclosure requirements produced a substantial obstacle
to the accomplishment of the federal goal of enabling investors
to make an objective and informed decision regarding a tender
offer.
12
Additionally, the court invalidated the statute on the ground
that it substantially interfered with interstate commerce, finding
that the statute significantly affected interstate transactions be-
cause it would apply even in situations in which no stockholder
resided in Idaho and no securities transaction occurred within
that state.3 The state's interest in protecting investors and in
regulating local companies was not sufficient to justify the great
impact such legislation has upon interstate commerce. The bur-
dens were held to be "disproportionate to the legitimate benefits"
provided by the Idaho law.
34
The decision in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell
places the future of the South Carolina Tender Offer Disclosure
Act upon unfirm ground. The South Carolina Act is similar to the
Idaho Act, and therefore may be successfully challenged in fed-
eral court.
29. Id. at 1275.
30. Id. at 1278 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2644).
31. 577 F.2d at 1278.
32. Id. at 1280.
33. Id. at 1283.
34. Id. at 1286.
[Vol. 31
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B. Fraudulent Sale of Securities
In Bradley v. Hullander35 the South Carolina Supreme Court
recognized a right of action under South Carolina Code section
35-1-149011 for rescission of a contract. The defrauded buyers were
allowed to rescind the contract and additionally were granted
costs and attorneys' fees, as provided by the statute. By bringing
the action under section 35-1-1490 rather than common law fraud
the buyers had a substantially less stringent burden of proof,
which enabled them to prevail.
The conflict between the parties arose out of the sale to
plaintiffs of the defendants' automobile dealership.37 Following
negotiations between the parties, a stock purchase agreement was
signed that provided for a total purchase price of $200,000 plus
any increase in net worth occurring between the date of the execu-
tion of the agreement and the time at which the plaintiffs as-
sumed control of the business. The record evidences some disa-
greement regarding the extent to which plaintiffs examined the
financial documents prior to closing the transaction.:"
Shortly after the plaintiffs took over the daily business opera-
tions of the dealership, they employed the services of a certified
public accountant to determine the financial status of the corpo-
35. 272 S.C. 6, 249 S.E.2d 486 (1978).
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1490 (1976) provides that:
Any person who:
(1) Offers or sells a security in violation of subsection (2) of § 35-1-170 or
§ 35-1-410 or § 35-1-810, or of any rule or order under § 35-1-50 which requires
the affirmative approval of sales literature before it is used or of any condition
imposed under § 35-1-950 or § 35-1-990; or
(2) Offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading, the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission, and who does
not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or omission;
Is liable to the person buying the security from him, who may sue either at
law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with
interest at six per cent per year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable
attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon
the tender of the security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less the value
of the security when the buyer disposed of it and interest at six per cent per year
from the date of dispositon.
Id.
37. Brief of Appellants-Respondents at 3.
38. See id.
1979]
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ration as of the date on which they had assumed control. This
audit revealed substantial discrepancies between the actual fi-
nancial condition of the business and the representations made
in the sales agreement. The buyers immediately instituted legal
action, alleging misrepresentation of the net worth of the com-
pany. 9 An agreement was reached that pieovided for partial res-
cission of the purchase and sale transaction and returned control
of the corporation to the defendants. The case continued in the
courts, however, to determine the extent of plaintiffs' recovery.'"
Defendants asserted a two-fold argument regarding the mer-
its of the case. First, the defendants claimed that the action was-
actually one for breach of warranty; therefore, no action could lie
under the Uniform Securities Act 4' unless it were shown that the
warranties were inserted voluntarily in the contract by the sellers,
rather than at the insistence of the buyers, and that the sellers
were aware of the falsity of such warranties." The defendants
argued that, in fact, the warranties had been inserted at the
insistence of the buyers and therefore no action for breach of
warranty should be allowed.43
Defendants' second argument rested on the ground that, in
an action brought under section 35-1-1490, the buyer must prove
that false representations were made by the seller and addition-
ally, that the buyer had no knowledge of the truth.4 In support
of this contention, the defendants cited several federal decisions
dealing with the Securities Act of 193315 upon which the South
Carolina statute is based.46 Furthermore, the defendants claimed
39. 272 S.C. at 13-14, 249 S.E.2d at 488-89.
40. Bradley also involved several complex procedural and evidentiary aspects that
will not be discussed here. Defendants additionally questioned whether the financial
statements actually contained any misrepresentation of the net worth of the company.
The issue will not be discussed in this survey because both the trial judge and the supreme
court felt that the evidence conclusively favored the buyers. For discussions of the con-
tents of these financial statements, compare Brief of Appellants-Respondents at 21 with
Brief of Respondents-Appellants at 18. Finally, the supreme court considered whether
parole evidence was admissible to show any representations or warranties extrinsic to the
writing. The court held that such evidence was not admissible. See note 44 infra.
41. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
42. Brief of Appellants-Respondents at 12-13.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 15. The trial judge refused to allow testimony of defendants on the question
of whether the buyers knew of the unsoundness of the warranties on the grounds that this
would violate the parole evidence rule and that a seller is estopped from asserting the
untruth of his own statements as a defense. 272 S.C. at 28-33, 249 S.E.2d at 498-99.
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & U.S.C.A. Supp. Pamph. 1978).
46. Brief of Appellants-Respondents at 16.
[Vol. 31
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that in order to allow recovery under section 35-1-1490 some evi-
dence of actual fraud or scienter (intent to defraud) must be
present in the seller's actions. The trial court had ruled that no
such intent on the part of the sellers existed; therefore, defen-
dants argued, no recovery should have been granted.
4
1
In reply to the defendants' first argument, the plaintiffs con-
tended that there is no South Carolina authority holding that a
fraud action cannot be maintained based on false warranties ex-
tracted by the buyers; however, even if such authority did exist,
it would not be applicable to actions brought under the Uniform
Securities Act.4" According to the plaintiffs, the Uniform Securi-
ties Act makes no distinction between breach of warranty and
fraud.49 The plaintiffs further argued that no finding of actual
fraud or scienter on the part of the seller was necessary." South
Carolina Code section 35-1-1490, in effect, makes the seller liable
regardless of his intent, unless the seller can demonstrate that his
actions were free from negligence. A finding of lack of scienter is
not equivalent to a finding of due diligence."
The decision of the trial court in favor of the buyers was
adopted in large part by the supreme court. The original order of
Judge Coleman granting rescission and awarding costs and attor-
neys' fees was incorporated into the supreme court's ruling. Judge
Coleman looked to section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 193352 for
guidance in interpreting the South Carolina statute. Accordingly,
he ruled that the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate only
that the defendants misstated or omitted certain material facts
and that the plaintiffs were not aware of the truth. The trial court
further ruled that a seller may violate the Uniform Securities Act
by mere negligence; no intent to defraud is necessary to maintain
the action.53
The trial judge concluded that the written statements made
by the sellers in the sales agreement "clearly [met] the test of
materiality"54 required by section 35-1-1490. 51 The Uniform Se-
47. Id. at 19.
48. Brief of Respondents-Appellants at 7.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 15.
51. Id. at 16.
52. 15 U.S.C. 771(2) (1976).
53. 272 S.C. at 32-33, 249 S.E.2d at 499.
54. Id. at 23, 249 S.E.2d at 495.
55. See note 36 supra.
1979]
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curities Act does not require buyers to show reliance, causation,
or that the sale would not have occurred absent the misstatement
of material fact.56 Judge Coleman further concluded that the
statements contained in the balance sheet were untrue and that
the buyers were unaware of the falsity of the statements. 7
The South Carolina Supreme Court unanimously agreed
with Judge Coleman's reasoning and affirmed his order with one
exception. The lower court had refused to order the sellers to
reimburse the buyers for the brokerage commission that the buy-
ers had paid. The supreme court reversed the ruling, holding that
the commission was attributable to the sellers' fraudulent con-
duct and therefore was a proper element of the buyers' statutory
recovery."
The decision of the supreme court in Bradley v. Hullander
opens the door for further litigation under section 35-1-1490. De-
frauded buyers may utilize this statutory cause of action rather
than rely on common-law fraud. As demonstrated by the court's
ruling in Bradley, actions brought under this section are consider-
ably less difficult to prove than common-law actions. As inter-
preted by the court, the statute requires only that material misre-
presentations or omissions be made and that the plaintiff have no
knowledge of the truth. Reliance and causation need not be
proved,59 nor is it necessary for the plaintiff to show that he could
not have discovered the falsity through due diligence.6" Perhaps
most importantly, under the statute the seller must assume the
burden of proving lack of negligence, but under common law the
burden is on the buyer to show actual intent to defraud on the
part of the seller.6
The statute relied upon in Bradley also provides for extensive
damages.2 In addition to rescission, the defrauded buyer can re-
cover costs and attorneys' fees. This statutory damage provision
is yet another advantage to bringing an action under section 35-
1-1490 rather than relying upon common-law fraud.
56. 272 S.C. at 22, 249 S.E.2d at 495 (citing Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l
Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 696 (5th Cir. 1971) and Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836,
841 (2d Cir. 1968)).
57. 272 S.C. at 22, 249 S.E.2d at 495.
58. Id. at 39-40, 249 S.E.2d at 502.
59. Id. at 22, 249 S.E.2d at 494.
60. Id. (citing Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 356 (10th Cir. 1970)).
61. Id. (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953)).
62. See note 36 supra.
[Vol. 31
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II. INSURANCE LAW - AUTOMOBILE INSURERS'
RIGHT TO CANCEL CONTRACTS WITH
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
In G-H Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Travelers Insurance
Companies3 the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the
state statute prohibiting insurers from cancelling an agency
agreement primarily to avoid writing insurance for high risk cus-
tomers was not intended merely for the protection of the public,
but was also intended to protect the private rights of insurance
agents. 4 This decision reversed the lower court's ruling 5 that
South Carolina Code section 38-37-940(2)66 did not create a pri-
vate cause of action. The supreme court limited its decision to a
determination that the cancellation of the agency contract was
wrongful and a private right of redress existed. The issues of the
constitutionality of the statute and the potential impairment of
the right to contract were not resolved until later in the year when
the court decided Rowell v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co.67
The conflict between the parties in G-H Insurance Agency
arose out of Travelers' attempt to terminate the agency relation-
ship that had existed between the parties since 1972. G-H had
operated as an independent agency for several years, soliciting
and writing automobile insurance for Travelers under an agency
contract." Prior to the 1974 enactment of Act 1177,9 which re-
vised South Carolina insurance law, Travelers had encouraged G-
H to solicit and write insurance for persons classified as nonstan-
dard or high risks. 71 Prior to 1974 these high risk individuals could
be charged higher premiums than those charged standard risk
individuals. As a result of Travelers' encouragement, approxi-
63. 270 S.C. 147, 241 S.E.2d 534 (1978).
64. Id. at 152, 241 S.E.2d at 536.
65. Reprinted in 270 S.C. 147, 155-76, 241 S.E.2d 534, 537-48 (Littlejohn and Ness,
JJ., dissenting).
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-37-940(2). This subsection provides:
No insurer of automobile insurance shall cancel its representation by an agent
primarily because of the volume of automobile insurance placed with it by the
agent on account of the statutory mandate of coverage nor because of the
amount of the agent's automobile insurance business which the insurer has
deemed it necessary to reinsure in the Facility.
Id.
67.- S.C. _ 250 S.E.2d 111 (1978). See text accompanying notes 95-122 infra.
68. Brief of Appellant at 1.
69. Codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-37-10 to -1520 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
70. 270 S.C. at 149, 241 S.E.2d at 534.
1979]
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mately half of the policies that G-H wrote for Travelers were
nonstandard risk policies.71 Travelers consequently benefited
from the higher premiums. Following revision of the state's in-
surance laws, classification of policy holders according to risk was
no longer permitted except under plans promulgated by the In-
surance Commissioner." This change forced all automobile insur-
ers, including Travelers, at least temporarily to charge standard
rates to all customers.
Shortly after this revision in the state law, Travelers notified
G-H that it wished to terminate the agency contract between the
parties, giving rise to the present case. G-H, believing that Trav-
elers desired to cancel the contract to avoid insuring the high risk
customers that comprised a large portion of G-H's business, ini-
tially applied to the Insurance Commissioner to prohibit the ter-
mination. The Commissioner refused to take the requested ac-
tion, claiming he was without authority to intervene. G-H then
brought suit to enjoin the termination and also to recover dam-
ages resulting from the cancellation of the agency contract.7 3
71. Id.
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-37-320 (1976). The section provides:
No distinctions shall be permitted nor made between policyholders or appli-
cants for such automobile insurance as respects coverages, policy terms, rates,
premium payment arrangements, claim services, or other services provided by
the insurer directly or through its agents or employees except as such distinc-
tions are relevant to and reflected in insurers' rating classifications under risk
and territorial classification plans promulgated by the Commissioner and ap-
proved by the Commission. No such risk classification plan shall be so promul-
gated or approved unless the criteria used for classifying risks are objective, clear
and unequivocal and based upon factually or statistically supported data, nor
unless the classifications in the rating plan are calculated to render possible the
compilation of credible statistical data both for purposes of determining prem-
iums and losses and for comparing the relative relationships between the loss
or expense experience or both of the respective classes. As regards its approval
or disapproval of risk and territorial classification plans, the Commission shall
be guided as respects the exercise of its discretion by the legislative intent of
Articles 1 to 15 of this chapter which is to make it possible for the Commissioner
to determine the total profit or loss and expense operating results of the entire
line of automobile insurance and each component thereof and of each automo-
bile insurer transacting insurance within the line and each component and to
make price comparisons between the rates and premium charges of the various
insurers; it being the further policy of Articles 1 to 15 of this chapter to render
possible the evaluation by the Commissioner of the performance of the total
insurance market and to enable him thereby to assist automobile insurance
consumers in making appropriate consumer decisions.
73. 270 S.C. at 150, 241 S.E.2d at 535.
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The lower court sustained Travelers' demurrer to the com-
plaint, stating that section 38-37-940(2) did not grant a private
cause of action. 4 Judge Bristow based his decision primarily on
the fact that Act 1177 contained no provision establishing civil
liability. According to the order granting the demurrer, because
the statute expressly provided for administrative sanctions, ' this
remedy precluded any private recovery. 6 The issue was subse-
quently appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
G-H argued that a private cause of action was created by
section 38-37-940 on the ground that the revised state insurance
laws had been enacted for the purpose of providing "a system of
automobile insurance that makes insurance available to all quali-
fied applicants on a nondiscriminatory basis."77 In order to assure
the success of this system, independent agents such as G-H must
be given an important role in implementing the modification of
the state's insurance laws brought about by Act 1177.78 G-H
argued that this Act modified Travelers' unilateral right to termi-
nate the agency agreement that existed between the parties and
that the state had the authority to modify this contractual right
since regulation of the insurance industry is a responsibility and
legitimate function of state government.7 1 According to G-H, al-
though Travelers had lost its right to terminate an insurance
agent who primarily wrote policies for high risk customers, this
statute was not completely one-sided. An insurance company
such as Travelers is permitted to cede up to thirty-five percent
of its total business to the Reinsurance Facility," thereby spread-
ing the risk among all companies doing business in South Caro-
lina. This provision allows an insurance company to lessen the
impact of any high risk policies written by its agents. Addition-
ally, an insurance company may apply for higher premium rates
in order to offset any losses caused by the volume of high risk
business.'
74. Record at 64, 66.
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-37-940 states, in part: "Any act in violation of this section
shall constitute an act of unlawful discrimination and unfair competition which, if willful,
shall result in the suspension or revocation of the insurer's certificate of authority for not
less than six months . . . ." Id.
76. Record at 64.
77. Brief of Appellant at 7 (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 15.
80. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-37-710, -950 (1976).
81. Id. § 38-37-780.
1979]
13
Page: Business Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
G-H's cause of action was based upon the theory of "unfair
competition. 8 2 The appellant claimed that Travelers' actions
were discriminatory and could be characterized as unfairly com-
petitive within the language and purposes of section 38-37-940.:
G-H argued that conduct designed to avoid the statutory man-
date of nondiscriminatory insurance coverage could be character-
ized as "unfair competition."84 Travelers' cancellation of the
agency contract merely because its agent had a high volume of
nonstandard risk policies was indicative of the inherent imbal-
ance of power between the insurance company and its indepen-
dent agent and demonstrated the great potential for unfair trade
practices. 5
Travelers contended that no private cause of action was cre-
ated by Act 1177 because section 38-37-940 was "plainly a regula-
tory statute designed to prohibit wrongs to the public.""6 Travel-
ers asserted that the state legislature intended Act 1177 to be
enforced by the Insurance Commission rather than by indepen-
dent agents such as the appellant. The respondent relied upon
the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Taggart v. Home
Finance Group, Inc.87 in which the court ruled that statutes regu-
lating insurance companies and their agents do not establish any
private right of action. 8
Travelers also contended that, even if the statute in question
could be construed to grant a private cause of action, G-H should
not be included in the class of persons that the statute was de-
signed to protect. 9 This argument was based on the assumption
that the primary purpose of the statute was to protect members
of the public; the statute was not intended to provide insurance
agents with protection from the cancellation of their agency con-
tracts. 0
In reaching its decision in favor of G-H, the South Carolina
Supreme Court viewed the action as one for the wrongful cancel-
lation of an agency contract, rather than one raising the question
82. Brief of Appellant at 20.
83. Id. See note 75 supra.
84. Brief of Appellant at 23.
85. Id. at 26.
86. Brief of Respondent at 8.
87. 239 S.C. 345, 123 S.E.2d 250 (1961).
88. Id. at 346, 123 S.E.2d at 252.
89. Brief of Respondent at 16.
90. Id. at 18-19.
[Vol. 31
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss1/3
BUSINESS LAW
of whether the statute created a private cause of action.' Accord-
ing to the court, the statute was relevant only in determining
whether the action taken by Travelers in cancelling the contract
was unlawful. Chief Justice Lewis, writing for the majority, held
that if section 38-37-940 were enacted for the agents' benefit, then
clearly Travelers' action must be considered wrongful.92 The court
concluded that the purpose of Act 1177 extended beyond mere
protection of the public. The language of the statute was inter-
preted to provide protection for the private rights of insurance
agents as well as for the public at large. Therefore, any agent who
was terminated for unlawful reasons could recover damages sus-
tained as a resilt of such termination.
9 3
Two members of the court dissented from the majority opin-
ion in G-H Insurance Agency. The dissent incorporated Judge
Bristow's original order sustaining Travelers' demurrer and was
based upon an interpretation of legislative intent. According to
the dissenting justices, the statute should not be interpreted to
broaden its protection beyond members of the public.94
The court's decision in G-H Insurance Agency was limited to
the issue of statutory interpretation. Several months later in
Rowell v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co.,"5 the court was pre-
sented with the question of whether the statute interpreted in G-
H Insurance Agency, section 38-37-940, was unconstitutional in
that it operated as an impairment of the insurer's contractual
right to cancel an agency relationship. The court, having pre-
viously held in G-H Insurance Agency that this provision permit-
ted a private right of action by an independent agent against an
insurance company that had unlawfully terminated an agency
contract, 6 used the opportunity presented in Rowell to expand its
previous ruling and hold that Act 1177 was not an unconstitu-
tional impairment of the contractual rights of the insurance com-
pany.97
The facts in Rowell are quite similar to those in G-H Insur-
ance Agency. In 1973 Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company
entered into a contract with Rowell, an independent agency, au-
91. 270 S.C. at 152, 241 S.E.2d at 536.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 154, 241 S.E.2d at 537 (Littlejohn and Ness, JJ., dissenting).
95. - S.C. _, 250 S.E.2d 111 (1978).
96. 270 S.C. at 152, 241 S.E.2d at 536.
97. - S.C. at -, 250 S.E.2d at 114.
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thorizing Rowell to solicit and write automobile insurance for
Harleysville. Many of the policies written by Rowell were for
nonstandard risk motorists for which Harleysville received higher
than ordinary premiums.98 Following the 1974 passage of Act
1177,11 however, it was no longer permissible to charge higher
premiums to nonstandard risks, making the business Harleysville
received from Rowell much less profitable than it previously had
been. Harleysville made several attempts to induce Rowell to
reduce the amount of automobile insurance written for Harleys-
ville. When these efforts were unsuccessful, Harleysville termi-
nated the agency relationship pursuant to the terms of the con-
tract between the parties, which permitted unilateral termination
upon sixty days notice.' 0
Rowell subsequently brought an action for injunctive relief,
alleging that Harleysville had violated section 38-37-940(2).'"'
The lower court, in a hearing on the merits of the case, ruled in
favor of Harleysville.' 2 Judge Singletary, although recognizing
that many other courts have ruled to the contrary,0 3 concluded
that the statutory prohibition against termination of an existing
agency relationship operated as an unconstitutional modification
of the obligations under the contract. 4 According to the lower
court's order, the contract between the parties was in existence
prior to the passage of Act 1177 and conformed to the law in effect
at the time of its execution. A retroactive application of the stat-
ute would "render nugatory the consent which formed the basis
of the contract."'0 5 This decision was subsequently appealed to
the South Carolina Supreme Court.
Rowell advanced arguments similar to those that had been
successful earlier in G-H Insurance Agency. Emphasis was placed
upon the designation of the insurance statutes as a "system"
designed to make automobile insurance available to all South
Carolina drivers and to distribute the high risk business among
all insurers doing business within the state. 06 Rowell further con-
98. Brief of Appellant at 1-2.
99. See note 69 supra.
100. Brief of Appellant at 3.
101. See note 66 supra.
102. Record at 24.
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id. at 24.
105. Id. at 18.
106. Brief of Appellant at 9.
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tended that the right to contract is not an absolute right, but may
be reasonably regulated if such regulation is in the best interest
of the community. Such'legislation, because of the general power
of the state, carries with it a presumption of constitutionality.1
7
Rowell urged that these two principles combined to place the
burden on Harleysville to prove that the enactment of the chal-
lenged statute was so arbitrary and unnecessary that the pre-
sumption of constitutionality should not stand.0 8
Rowell also argued that the authority of an insurance com-
pany such as Harleysville to operate within South Carolina origi-
nates with the license granted to the company by the state."' This
license implies that the company is subject to all applicable state
legislation. The appellant argued that the constitutional prohibi-
tion against impairment of contract does not extend to licenses,
and thus any change in state regulations would continue to affect
the licensee. °" Rowell took issue with the lower court's characteri-
zation of Act 1177 as retroactive, arguing that the legislation was
"remedial" because it was designed to remedy prior existing con-
ditions;' 1 therefore, it should not fall within the definition of a
retroactive law. The appellant further argued that Harleysville
had no reasonable expectation that the insurance law of South
Carolina would not change because the statute clearly states that
all insurance companies doing business within the state would be
expected to "perform all duties now or hereafter prescribed by
law.""
2
Harleysville countered these arguments by relying heavily on
the consensual nature of the contract. According to the respon-
dent, parties to a contract are entitled to rely upon the law that
exists at the time the contract is executed. To allow such agree-
ments to be subsequently altered by the state legislature would
be contrary to the protection afforded contracts by the Constitu-
tion.1 3 Additionally, Harleysville argued that the provision of the
Act that prohibits the termination of an agency relationship'"
107. Id. at 17-18 (citing Beaufort County v. Jasper County, 220 S.C. 469, 479, 63
S.E.2d 421, 426 (1951); Gaud v. Walker, 214 S.C. 451, 462, 53 S.E.2d 316, 320 (1949);
Mosely v. Welch, 209 S.C. 19, 26-27, 39 S.E.2d 133, 137 (1946)).
108. Brief of Appellant at 21.
109. Id. at 33.
110. Id. at 40.
111. Id. at 49.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-5-70 (1976).
113. Brief of Respondent at 17.
114. See note 66 supra.
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was not designed to serve a public purpose; therefore, Act 1177
should not be used to prevent the action taken by Harleysville., 5
The respondents pointed to the G-H Insurance Agency decision
in which the supreme court held that the statute was designed not
only to benefit the public, but also to provide relief for insurance
agents. According to Harleysville, this statutory purpose was not
sufficient to "require or warrant indefinite restriction of an exist-
ing contractual right.
116
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court
and ruled that application of the statute to prevent the cancella-
tion of insurance agency contracts could not be viewed as uncon-
stitutionally impairing existing contractual rights or obliga-
tions."7 In this decision, as in the earlier ruling in G-H Insurance
Agency, the court relied heavily on the theory that Act 1177 was
designed to provide a "system" of insurance coverage. The court
accepted the contention that the respondents possessed no vested
rights under the contract and therefore could claim no constitu-
tional protection."' According to the court, Harleysville applied
for and accepted the state license with full knowledge that the
license was subject to the reservations set forth in section 38-5-
70." The provision restricting the company's right to terminate
was well within the regulatory power of the state and was reme-
dial in nature. The court indicated, however, that the statute was
effective only in preventirig retaliation by the insurance company
against the agent and did not affect Harleysville's right to cancel
the contract for any other reason.'
Justices Littlejohn and Ness dissented from the majority
opinion, just as they had in G-H Insurance Agency. They found
nothing in Act 1177 to indicate that the legislature intended to
adversely affect existing contracts.12' According to the dissent, the
nullification of existing contractual rights allowed by the major-
ity opinion constituted a violation of the constitutional prohibi-
115. Brief of Respondent at 21.
116. Id. at 24.
117. - S.C. at , 250 S.E.2d at 114.
118. Id. at -, 250 S.E.2d at 113.
119. S.C. CODE A1N. § 38-5-70 (1976) states: "Every insurance company shall, as a
condition for the privilege of entering into and doing business in this State, pay all taxes
and perform all duties now or hereafter prescribed by law. "Id. (emphasis added). See text
accompanying note 112 supra.
120. - S.C. at , 250 S.E.2d at 114.
121. Id. at -, 250 S.E.2d at 115 (Littlejohn and Ness, JJ., dissenting).
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tion against impairing the right to contract.'
2
The decisions of the supreme court in G-H Insurance Agency,
Inc. v. Travelers Insurance Companies and Rowell v. Harleysville
Mutual Insurance Co. seemingly foreclose future litigation on the
issue of the rights given to insurance agents by section 38-37-940.
Insurance companies can no longer terminate an agency relation-
ship simply because it is unprofitable. Unless new legislation is
passed altering section 38-37-940, an insurance company that
desires to do business in South Carolina will be subject to an
action for damages if it unlawfully cancels an agency agreement.
Nancy Page
122. Id. at _, 250 S.E.2d at 116 (Littlejohn and Ness, JJ.. dissenting).
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